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Abstract 
Local government in post-apartheid South Africa has undergone fundamental transformation. This is 
evident from its extensive governing powers and functions and its expanded developmental mandate. 
At the forefront of sustainable development, municipalities have legislative and executive powers to 
administer the matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996. Moreover, matters listed in Schedules 4A and 5A of the Constitution can be assigned to 
municipalities by national and provincial governments. Like other spheres of government, 
municipalities are obliged to contribute towards realising s 24 of the Constitution – guaranteeing 
environmental rights. However, the exact contours of their powers in promoting the objectives of s 24 
of the Constitution are ill-defined and subject to ongoing definition by way of legislation, policies and 
case-law. This article argues that environmental litigation presents courts an opportunity to further 
redefine the powers of municipalities in fostering constitutional environmental objectives in South 
Africa. Drawing from Le Sueur and Another v eThekwini Municipality and Others [2013] ZAKZPHC 
6 (30 January 2013), this article demonstrates how courts can play an important role in clarifying the 
environmental powers and functions of municipalities in South Africa. This article is based on a 
review of legal and extra-legal sources. 
 
Introduction 
Local government in post-apartheid South Africa has undergone fundamental constitutional 
transformation (Fedsure Life Assurance case 1998, pars 35–38; Fuo 2014, pp. 86–117). Local 
government is a distinct, interdependent, and interrelated sphere of government with extensive 
governing powers and functions as well as an expanded developmental mandate (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996, ss 151–156; de Visser 2005, p. 65; du Plessis 2010, pp. 265–269; 
Blue Moonlight case 2012, par 57 and 66; City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005, pars 55–60). Local 
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government's expanded developmental mandate obliges municipalities to provide services to 
communities in a sustainable manner (s 152(1)(b) of the Constitution; Joseph case 2010, pars 34–40)1 
provide democratic and accountable government for local communities (s 152(1)(a) of the 
Constitution; de Visser 2005, p. 70); promote socio-economic development (s 152(1)(c) and 153 (a) 
of the Constitution); 2  promote a safe and healthy environment (s 152(d) of the Constitution); 
encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government (s 152(1)(e) of the Constitution; Joseph case 2010, pars 27, 34–40); participate in national 
and provincial development programmes (s 153(b) of the Constitution); and contribute (together with 
other spheres of government and organs of state) towards the realisation of, inter alia, the 
constitutional environmental right (ss 2, 7(2) and 24 of the Constitution).3  
Sections 24 and 7(2) of the Constitution obliges the state (inclusive of municipalities) to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights and further requires government to adopt 
legislative and other measures to realise the right of everyone to an environment that is not harmful to 
their health and well-being. These obligations apply to, and bind the legislative and executive arms of 
government in all spheres (de Visser 2003, pp. 201–215). In the context of local government, sections 
4(2)(j) and 23(1)(c) of the Systems Act explicitly obliges municipalities to contribute, together with 
other organs of state, to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in, inter alia, 
section 24 of the Constitution. The direct implication of these statutory provisions is that 
municipalities are legally bound to realise aspects of the constitutional environmental right that fall 
within their shared or exclusive areas of competence (Steytler and de Visser 2009, pp. 9–12). The 
general obligation that local government should promote sustainable development arguably makes 
environmental protection a core mandate of local government (du Plessis 2008, pp. 10–13, 337–516; 
du Plessis and du Plessis 2011, p. 424). Municipalities are therefore obliged to contribute towards 
realising the objectives of s 24 of the Constitution.  
Despite the above obligations, on face value, Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution give an 
indication of the areas of environmental competence for municipalities. However, the exact contours 
of their powers in promoting the objectives of section 24 of the Constitution are subject to ongoing 
definition by way of legislation, policies and interpretation by courts. This article argues that courts 
have an important role to play in redefining the environmental powers and functions of municipalities 
                                                             
1 Ch 8 of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
2 See Preamble and s 4(2)(g) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
3 S 24 of the Constitution provides that “Everyone has the right – (a) to an environment that is not harmful to 
their health or wellbeing; and (b) to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that (i) prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.” 
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beyond the rigid walls of Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution. This article is divided into four 
main parts. The first part begins by highlighting the role of courts in realising the objectives of the 
constitutional environmental right in South Africa. The second part provides an overview of the 
‘original’ environmental powers and functions of municipalities as outlined in the Constitution. The 
third part explores additional sources of local government's powers in environmental matters. Using 
Le Sueur and Another v eThekwini Municipality and Others,4 the fourth part shows how litigation has 
already been used to expand the environmental powers and functions of municipalities beyond 
Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution. Drawing inspiration from the Le Sueur case, this article 
argues that environmental litigation presents courts with the opportunity to contribute towards 
clarifying the constitutional environmental powers and functions of South African municipalities. 
This article is based on a review of primary and secondary sources of law. 
Courts and environmental protection in South Africa 
South African courts have an important role to play in ensuring that the objectives of the 
constitutional environmental right are realised (Kidd 2006, pp. 72–87; du Plessis 2008, pp. 343–344; 
Kotze and du Plessis 2010, pp. 160–162).5  In the Fuel Retailers case, 6  the Constitutional Court 
affirmed that the role of the courts is very important in the context of the protection of the 
environment and giving effect to the principle of sustainable development. The Court observed that 
the importance of environmental protection cannot be gainsaid given that the enjoyment of other 
rights in the Bill of Rights is dependent on the realisation of the environmental right. The Court 
indicated that the trusteeship position of courts carries with it the responsibility to look after the 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations (Fuel Retailers case, par 102).  
Proceeding from the above premise, the Court affirmed that an independent judiciary and the judicial 
process are vital for the interpretation, implementation, development and enforcement of 
environmental law (Fuel Retailers case, par 103). The Court stressed that when the need arises for 
courts to intervene in order to protect the environment, “they should not hesitate to do so” (Fuel 
Retailers, par 104). In this context, it has been argued by Kotze and du Plessis (2010, pp. 159–160) 
that the role of courts is generally four-fold: Firstly, courts ‘uphold’ environmental law in practice by 
carefully considering rights and interests and then making reasonable, just, lawful and equitable 
findings; secondly, courts solve environmental disputes between litigants by interpreting and applying 
the law – giving effect to one of the basic functions of law, maintaining order and social control; 
                                                             
4 Le Sueur and Another v eThekwini Municipality and Others [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013). 
5 For details on the foundation, hierarchy of courts and administration of justice in South Africa, see Ch 8 of the 
Constitution. 
6 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province and Others 2007 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC). 
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thirdly, courts contribute to the deepening of environmental law discourse through performing the 
previous two roles. This gives them an opportunity to analyse, interpret, explain and refine existing 
environmental law. Finally, in deepening environmental law discourse, courts contribute to law-
making (Kotze and du Plessis 2010, pp. 159–160). In the context of the country's three-sphere 
government, the exercise of the court’s role in environmental protection may lead to a clearer 
understanding of the duties as well as powers and functions of each sphere of government. 
In South Africa, legal scholars have traditionally placed much emphasis on the role of courts in 
developing the substantive content of the constitutional environmental right and in explaining the 
legal environmental duties imposed by the Constitution on the government – in terms of the wording 
of the constitutional environmental right and the typology of respect, protect, promote and fulfil (de 
Wet and du Plessis 2010, pp. 345–376; Kotze and du Plessis 2010, pp. 157–176; du Plessis 2011, pp. 
279–307). In this article, I argue that litigation presents courts the opportunity to use their position to 
clarify the powers of municipalities in furthering the objectives of section 24 of the Constitution.   
Original environmental powers and functions of municipalities 
A central feature of the previous system of local government was its lack of self-governing powers. 
Local government was subjected to strict control by provincial and national governments and bylaws 
passed by local authorities were, for example, subject to the approval of the Provincial Administrator 
(Fuo 2014, pp. 78–81). This stringent control over local government's law-making powers reduced 
local authorities to decentralised executive agencies for relevant central government departments (Fuo 
2014, pp. 78–81). However, as part of the democratic transformation, the self-governing power of 
local government is now entrenched in section 151(2) and (3) of the Constitution. In the Fedsure Life 
Assurance case,7 the Court described the newly established constitutional powers of local government 
within the context of the Interim Constitution as follows: 
The constitutional status of local government is thus materially different to what it was 
when parliament was supreme, when not only the powers but the very existence of local 
government depended entirely on superior legislatures. The institution of elected local 
government could then have been terminated at any time and its functions entrusted to 
administrators appointed by central or provincial governments. That is no longer the 
position. Local governments have a place in the constitutional order...and are entitled to 
certain powers, including the power to make bylaws and impose rates. 
The significance of the above extract is that the core functions of local government as defined by the 
Constitution cannot be removed or amended by ordinary statute or provincial legislation. The powers 
and functions of local government can only be changed by a constitutional amendment (de Visser 
2005, p. 114).  
                                                             
7  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 at par 36. 
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In the City of Cape Town and Other v Robertson, 2005,8 the Court reiterated the extent of local 
government's transformation, powers and functions when it asserted that: 
The Constitution has moved away from a hierarchical division of governmental power 
and has ushered in a new vision of government in which the sphere of local government 
is interdependent, ‘inviolable and possesses the constitutional latitude within which to 
define and express its unique character’ subject to constraints permissible under our 
Constitution. A municipality under our Constitution is not a mere creature of statute 
otherwise moribund save if imbued with power by provincial and national legislation. A 
municipality enjoys ‘original’ and constitutionally entrenched powers, functions, rights 
and duties that may be qualified or constrained by law and only to the extent the 
Constitution permits. Now the conduct of the municipality is not always invalid only for 
the reason that no legislation authorises it. Its powers may derive from the 
Constitution or from legislation of a competent authority or from its own laws.  
The above extract highlights the extent of constitutional transformation of local government in South 
Africa. It demonstrates inter alia that local government is entrenched in the Constitution as an 
interdependent sphere of government, enjoying a certain degree of autonomy. While demonstrating 
that the transformation established a co-relationship between local, provincial and national 
governments (Malan 2005, p. 227; du Plessis 2008, p. 425), it makes it clear that local government 
has ‘original’ powers and functions that can only be constrained within the ambit of the Constitution. 
Generally, the original powers and functions of local government are set out in section 156 of the 
Constitution. According to section 156(1) and (2) of the Constitution, a municipality has executive 
and legislative authority in respect of, and has the right to administer the local government matters 
listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. The matters listed in these 
constitutional Schedules constitute the original powers of local government because they are directly 
sourced from the Constitution (Christmas and de Visser 2009, pp. 107–119). Matters listed in these 
Schedules are outlined in Table 1 below. 
Although the Constitutional Court has indicated in the context of the right of access to housing that 
section 156 and Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution are not the only source of local 
government's powers (Blue Moonlight case 2012, pars 21–29, 46–67), these provisions show 
functional areas where municipalities have executive and legislative (law-making) powers and 
confirm local government's distinctiveness as a sphere of government (de Visser 2009, p. 12; 
Christmas and de Visser 2009, p. 111). 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 City of Cape Town and Other v Robertson and Other 2005 (2) SA 323 (CC) at par 60. Own emphasis. 
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 Table 1: Legislative competence 
Schedule 4B of Constitution: Local government's 
areas of legislative competence 
Schedule 5B of Constitution: Local government matters 
over which provinces have legislative competence 
Air pollution 
Building regulations 
Child care facilities 
Electricity and gas reticulation 
Fire-fighting services 
Local tourism 
Municipal airports 
Municipal planning 
Municipal health services 
Municipal public transport 
Municipal public works 
Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and harbours, excluding 
the regulation of international/national shipping matters  
Stormwater management systems in built-up areas 
Trading regulations 
Water and sanitation services limited to potable water 
supply systems  
Domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems 
Beaches and amusement facilities 
Billboards and the display of advertisements in public places 
Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria 
Cleansing 
Control of public nuisances 
Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public 
Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals 
Fencing and fences 
Licensing of dogs  
Licensing and control of undertakings selling food to the public 
Local amenities 
Local sport facilities 
Markets 
Municipal abattoirs 
Municipal parks and recreation 
Municipal roads 
Noise pollution 
Pounds 
Public places 
Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal 
Street trading  
Street lighting  
Traffic and parking 
From the above table, it appears that the original powers and functions of municipalities in the area of 
environmental protection are limited to ‘brown issues’9 such as: air and noise pollution; municipal 
health services; sanitation services; refuse removal, refuse dumps, and solid waste disposal; fire 
fighting; sewage disposal; and municipal planning. It is apparent that some of these functions are 
interrelated. In addition, it is important to note that some of the listed functions are open to 
interpretation. The 2004 White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships notes that: 
The meaning of these functions is not defined in the Constitution or elsewhere. At times a 
co-operative process has been required in order to determine functional boundaries with 
other spheres of government in certain areas including health care, housing and 
transport. Currently the Department is considering the meaning of these functions and is 
clarifying boundaries (Department of Provincial and Local Government 2004, p. 4). 
The co-operative process of interpreting these functions does not always result in consensus. 10 
However, it should be noted that a purposive interpretation of the above listed functions, together with 
the Bill of Rights and objectives of developmental local government, can provide municipalities 
                                                             
9 In environmental discourse, a difference is often drawn between ‘brown’ and ‘green’ issues. While green 
issues typically cover nature conservation, brown issues deal with urban environmental challenges such as 
access to services (such water, energy and sanitation) waste management and air pollution, for example. See 
Cock J. 2004. Connecting the red, brown and green: The environmental justice movement in South Africa. 
Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal at 2–3. 
10 For example, it has taken a number of cases for the courts to clarify the planning powers of municipalities vis-
à-vis other spheres of government. See Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2012 (7) BCLR 
690 (CC); Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v 
Habitat Council and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC); Minister of Local Government, Western Cape v Lagoonbay 
Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC); Minister of Local Government, Environmental 
Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v Habitat Council and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC). 
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legislative and executive competence to cater for other environmental related functions that are not 
explicitly listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution. For example, as it will become evident 
from the discussion below that municipal planning has been interpreted as a function which gives 
legislative and executive competence to municipalities in biodiversity protection. 
According to Steytler and Fessha (2005, p. 2), section 156 of the Constitution shows that provincial 
and national governments “have only limited supervisory authority” with regard to the functional 
areas in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution. This means that the other spheres of government 
retain the powers to support and monitor the extent to which municipalities perform their 
environmental related functions listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution (Steytler and 
Fessha 2005, p. 2). Due to the fact that the original powers and functions of municipalities are rooted 
in the Constitution, they cannot be removed or amended by national or provincial legislation except 
by an amendment of the Constitution itself (de Visser 2005, pp. 113–114). To de Visser (2005, p. 
114), this is the most significant and fundamental feature of the institutional integrity of local 
government. Besides, section 156(5) grants municipalities “the right to exercise any power 
concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of its 
functions.” de Visser (2005, pp. 121–122) refers to powers derived from section 156(5) of the 
Constitution by municipalities as ‘incidental’ powers.  
It is important to note that section 229(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution accords municipalities the 
powers to generate revenue through rates and taxes in order to be able to finance its activities.11 This 
means that municipalities with a viable economic base can self-fund environmental programmes 
adopted to give effect to their constitutional environmental mandate. The constitutional powers 
accorded to municipalities to generate internal revenue is given legislative effect by, inter alia, 
sections 4(1)(c) and 71 of the Systems Act. The power of municipalities to generate internal revenue 
has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in a number of cases.12  
In addition to the original environmental powers and functions of municipalities outlined in Schedules 
4B and 5B of the Constitution, additional environmental powers and functions can be assigned to 
municipalities. The paragraphs that follow highlights the relevant constitutional provision and 
                                                             
11 See the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act 12 of 2007, which seeks to clarify the powers and 
functions of municipalities in this regard. The Preamble provides that the Act seeks to “regulate the exercise by 
municipalities of their power to impose surcharges on fees for services provided under section 229(1)(a) of the 
Constitution; to provide for the authorisation of taxes, levies and duties that municipalities may impose 
under section 229(1)(b) of the Constitution; and for matters connected therewith.”  
12 See Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) at pars 61, 64 and 73; 
Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town [2007] 1 All SA 233 (SCA) at pars 1–20; City of Cape Town Others v 
Robertson, pars 61–71; Joseph and Others, pars 53 and 54. 
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demonstrates that national legislation and policies usually require municipalities to execute 
environmental functions that go beyond their ‘original’ powers and functions. 
Environmental powers beyond constitutional schedules 
One of the novel features that became applicable at the local government level following the process 
of constitutional transformation is the principle of institutional subsidiarity (Carpenter 1999, pp. 45–
46; de Visser 2008, p. 2; de Visser 2010, pp. 90–115). Although the Constitution does not make 
express reference to ‘subsidiarity’, it is believed that this principle influenced its design in terms of 
allocating and safeguarding powers between the three spheres of government (de Visser 2010, p. 100). 
In this context for example, de Visser (2008, p. 3) has situated the subsidiarity principle within section 
156(4) of the Constitution which provides that: 
The national and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, by agreement 
and subject to any conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of Schedule 
4 and  Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if – 
(a) that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and if 
(b) the municipality has the capacity to administer. 
The above provision embodies the allocative institutional subsidiarity principle in that it requires 
national and provincial spheres of government to assign or allocate to municipalities certain 
(environmental) functions that can be better discharged by municipalities, subject to the satisfaction of 
certain conditions (de Visser 2008, p. 7, p. 12). De Visser (2010, p. 112) indicates that the wordings of 
section 156(4) of the Constitution show that assignment is compulsory once the requirements have 
been met.  Assignments under section 154(6) of the Constitution can be general to all municipalities 
or to a specific municipality (de Visser 2008, pp. 29–30). Where there is legislative assignment, full 
legislative and executive powers over an environmental function are transferred to a municipality. In 
the case of executive assignments, only the executive/administrative power over a specific 
environmental function is assigned to a municipality. Sections 9 to 10 of the Systems Act outline the 
procedure for assigning powers to municipalities. It is important to note that district municipalities can 
also transfer some core functions to a local municipality (de Visser 2008, pp. 29–30). From section 
156(4) of the Constitution, it is clear that, in addition to matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution, there is the possibility for more environmental functions contained in Part A of Schedule 
4 and Part A of Schedule 5 to be assigned to local government (de Visser 2005, pp. 142–143).13 
                                                             
13 Schedule 4A of the Constitution outlines areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence. 
On the other hand, Schedule 5A outlines the areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence. 
 Fuo 
 
The courts & LG’s environmental powers in South Africa 
 
  
CJLG December 2015 25 
 
Besides section 156(4) of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights has a direct bearing on local 
government's environmental powers and duties. 14  As indicated above, in addition to the duty to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the section 24 constitutional environmental right, municipalities 
are equally obliged to adopt and implement reasonable legislative and other measures (such as 
bylaws, policies, plans) that will contribute towards the realisation of an environment that is not 
harmful to health and well-being (du Plessis 2010, pp. 266–268; Fuo 2013, pp. 13–15). Measures 
adopted to give effect to section 24 of the Constitution should also be directed towards preventing 
pollution and ecological degradation; promoting conservation; and securing ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justiciable socio-economic development.  
The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court also suggests that reasonable legislative and other 
measures adopted to realise all socio-economic rights must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks 
to the various spheres of government, including the financial resources necessary for their execution.15 
However, the degree of responsibility of the three spheres of government may differ, especially in 
accordance with their related powers and functions and access to resources.  As argued elsewhere 
(Fuo 2013, pp. 1–44), the positive duty to adopt reasonable legislative and executive measures to give 
effect to section 24 of the Constitution amounts to a constitutional delegation of authority to the 
legislative and executive branches of government – in all spheres – to give effect to relevant rights 
through legislation and policies, for example. This constitutional delegation of authority is relevant 
and applicable to all municipalities. In this regard, it has been argued  that “local authorities can be 
held liable, even if only to some degree, should they not adhere to the duties created by section 24” of 
the Constitution (du Plessis 2011, p. 268). 
It must be stressed that although the Constitutional Court indicated in the Fuel Retailers case that 
municipalities are obliged to promote the objectives of sustainable development, it has not precisely 
defined the responsibility of municipalities in realising section 24 of the Constitution. This is not 
strange given that the Court is yet to give content to the scope or normative meaning of the section 24 
constitutional environmental rights. However, the novel duty imposed on local government to 
promote a safe and healthy environment suggests that municipalities should strive to ensure that the 
inter-relationship between people and the natural environment is such that the environment is not and 
does not become harmful to human health (du Plessis 2011, p. 293). Municipalities should manage the 
environment in such a manner that it can cater for peoples’ dependence on resources such as drinking 
water, food and air to breathe (du Plessis 2011, p. 293).  
                                                             
14 This has already been the focus of an LLD thesis. See du Plessis Fulfilment of South Africa's Constitutional 
Environmental Right in the Local Government Sphere (2008, North-West University, Potchefstroom). 
15 See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 11 BCLR 1169 
(CC) para 38. 
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Managing the environment goes beyond the conservation of natural resources and has much to do 
with peoples’ health, access to water and sanitation, as well as land use (du Plessis 2011, p. 285; 
Urquhart and Atkinson 2002, pp. 20–21). The duty to promote a healthy environment also suggests 
that the natural environment should be managed in such a way that enables people to live and work 
under conditions that will not harm their mental and physical health (du Plessis 2011, pp. 293–294). 
In general, it seems that the protection of communities from increasingly life-threatening 
environmental trends such as pollution and floods, all fall within the ambit of the duty imposed on 
local government to ensure a healthy environment. Ineffective legal and other responses to these life-
threatening environmental trends have the potential to negatively affect peoples’ health through for 
example, the spread of diseases (Besada and Sewankambo 2009, pp. 16–20). 
The constitutional requirement to clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to the various spheres of 
government, framework and sector-specific environmental legislation and policies designed to give 
effect to section 24 of the Constitution usually requires local government to play a role in realising the 
objectives of the constitutional environmental right (du Plessis 2008, pp. 408–416). For example, the 
National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 107 of 1998, South Africa’s main framework 
environmental legislation, which applies to all spheres of government and organs of state, provides a 
principled framework for environmental governance at the local government level because it outlines 
environmental functions and duties for local government as well as a number of environmental law 
principles that should guide municipalities’ interpretation, administration and implementation of 
environmental matters (du Plessis 2008, pp. 391–401). This implies that the environmental 
management principles contained in section 2 of NEMA should also guide the implementation of the 
section 24 constitutional environmental obligations by all organs of state, including municipalities (du 
Plessis 2008, p. 392). Therefore, the principles of environmental management outlined in section 2 of 
NEMA generally apply to all actions of all municipalities that have the potential to significantly affect 
the environment. 
The potential role of courts through the lenses of Le Sueur    
This part of the article uses the Le Sueur case to illustrate that litigation provides an opportunity for 
courts to expand the environmental powers and functions of municipalities beyond Schedules 4B and 
5B of the Constitution. It begins by briefly setting out the facts, decision and ratio decidendi of the 
court and then reflects on some valuable lessons for the future. 
Facts of the case 
One of the two issues that had to be dealt with in the Le Sueur case arose from a resolution adopted by 
the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality on the 9 of December 2010 to amend its Town Planning 
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Scheme by introducing the Durban Metropolitan Open Space System (D-MOSS).16 D-MOSS is a 
system of open spaces, comprising 74,000 hectares of land and water. It incorporates areas of high 
biodiversity value, linked together in a viable network of open spaces (eThekwini Municipality no 
date).  Areas included in D-MOSS are nature reserves, forests, large rural landscapes in the upper 
catchments and riverine and coastal corridors. Some areas of privately owned land are included in D-
MOSS. D-MOSS was introduced to by the Municipality to contribute towards biodiversity 
conservation by inter alia meeting provincial and national biodiversity targets. D-MOSS provides a 
range of ecosystem goods and services to Durban residents.17 
The applicants in this case were owners of property affected by the D-MOSS resolutions – largely 
worried that their property would be expropriated for that purpose. 18   They argued before the 
Pietermaritzburg High Court that the decision to introduce D-MOSS should be declared 
unconstitutional and illegal and accordingly set aside. Their argument was based on two main reasons: 
the resolutions were taken in terms of Town Planning Ordinance No. 27 of 1947 which had by that 
date been repealed and replaced by the Kwazulu-Natal Planning and Development Act No. 6 of 
2008; 19 and that the respondents lacked constitutional and legislative powers to legislate on 
environmental issues – especially those relating to conservation and biodiversity protection.20  In this 
context, attention is given to the second issue/argument raised. 
The applicants argued that in introducing the D-MOSS Amendments, the Municipality had acted ultra 
vires its powers as it did not have law-making powers in the sphere of the environment. 21  The 
applicants argued that the ‘environment’ is listed in Schedule 4A of the Constitution as a functional 
area of current national and provincial competence, therefore excluding municipalities from 
legislating in such area of activity. 22  Furthermore, the applicants submitted that NEMA, South 
Africa's environmental framework law, does not accord municipalities law-making powers relating to 
environmental protection. It was argued that by creating the D-MOSS Amendments, the Metro had 
legislated for the protection of the environment and created its own process for authorising 
environmental related activities at a municipal level.  The applicants submitted that the environmental 
powers and functions of national and provincial government are different and distinct from the 
planning powers and functions of municipalities. 23  The applicants argued that the other related 
                                                             
16 Le Sueur and Another, par 1. 
17 For details, see: What is the Durban Metropolitan Open Space System, eThekwini Municipality (no date). 
18 See Le Sueur and Another, pars 17–18. 
19 Le Sueur and Another, pars 3–4 and 5–15. 
20 See Le Sueur and Another, pars 3–4. 
21 See Le Sueur and Another, par 16. 
22 See Le Sueur and Another, par 16. 
23 See Le Sueur and Another, par 16. 
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functional areas in respect of which municipalities have authority are air pollution; storm water 
management services; water and sanitation services; beaches; cemeteries; facilities for the 
accommodation, care and burial of animals; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal.  
They argued that although section 152(d) of the Constitution obliges municipalities to promote a safe 
and healthy environment, the constitutional areas of competence of municipalities do not extend to the 
area of ‘environment’ or ‘nature conservation’ or ‘biodiversity protection’.24   The applicants argued 
further that in as much as D-MOSS Amendments relate to land which consists of ‘indigenous forests’, 
the ‘administration of indigenous forests’ is a National or Provincial functional area in respect of 
which the Municipality has no authority to legislate. The applicants contended that although there 
may be an overlap between regulation of land use and other functional areas, such overlapping does 
not give a municipality power to legislate in the overlapping functional areas. Based on the above 
reasoning, the applicants argued that in attempting to legislate on issues in relation to the 
environment, the Municipality had acted unconstitutionally and illegally. From this point of view, the 
applicants argued that the D-MOSS Amendments should be set aside as being unconstitutional and 
illegal.25  
Decision and ‘ratio decidendi’ 
Justice Gyanda concurred with the submission of the first respondent (eThekwini Metro) that the 
reasoning adopted by the applicants was unduly narrow and incorrect for several reasons.26 Firstly, the 
Court indicated that as an organ of state, each municipality is obliged to comply with the obligations 
imposed on the state by section 7(2) of the Constitution to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” as 
well as the section 24 constitutional environmental right.27 Reference to the ‘state’ in section 7(2) 
includes the local sphere of government which is constituted by municipalities. The obligation 
imposed by sections 7(2) and 24(b) of the Constitution to inter alia promote conservation, secure 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources do not only apply to national and 
provincial governments. The obligation extends to the local sphere of government. 28  The Court 
indicated that a joint reading of several constitutional provisions – such as sections 7(2), 24, 152(d), 
40, 41(1) and 43 – make it clear that the “functional areas of constitutional competence as set out in 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution are not the only provisions dealing with governmental 
responsibilities and duties”. 29  A joint reading of the above provisions makes it clear that 
                                                             
24 See Le Sueur and Another, par 16. 
25 See Le Sueur and Another, par 16. 
26 Le Sueur and Another, par 19. 
27 Le Sueur and Another, par 19. 
28 Le Sueur and Another, par 19. 
29 Le Sueur and Another, pars 19 and 20. 
 Fuo 
 
The courts & LG’s environmental powers in South Africa 
 
  
CJLG December 2015 29 
 
municipalities cannot legislate in conflict with section 24 of the Constitution and can implement 
policies and by-laws that seek to protect the environment against “improper invasion”.30  
In addition, the Court acknowledged that apart from matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution, municipalities have powers to administer any matter assigned by national or provincial 
legislation.31 In this regard, matters reserved for national and provincial legislative competence which 
necessarily relates to local government can be assigned to a municipality (or to municipalities in 
general) if the criteria in section 156(4) of the Constitution have been met. In an implicit 
acknowledgement of the principle of institutional subsidiarity, the Court noted that municipalities 
“are in the best position to know, understand, and deal with issues involving the environment at the 
local level”.32 The Court observed that the assignment of environmental powers and functions to 
municipalities, coupled with their incidental administrative powers, indicate that the legislative 
powers and functions of the three spheres of government are fluid and not watertight.33 The Court 
upheld the view that although the environment was not inserted in Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution, it “is an ideal example of an area of legislative and executive authority or power which 
had to reside in all three levels of government” and thus requiring co-operative government. 34   
Thirdly, the Court noted that municipalities have historically exercised within their jurisdictions 
legislative and executive responsibility over environmental issues under the banner of ‘municipal 
planning’, a fact recognised in the manner in which the newer constitutional dispensation was 
designed.35 The Court observed that both at the time that the Constitution was adopted and subsequent 
thereto, national and provincial legislation and policies have allocated municipalities a legislative and 
executive mandate with respect to environmental matters (including biodiversity conservation), 
placing such matters squarely within the concept of municipal planning.36 Based on this historical 
consciousness, the Court held that it is clear that when the functional areas were allocated in 
Schedules 4 and 5, the framers of the Constitution knew that ‘municipal planning’ encompassed 
environmental considerations.37   
In this regard, Chapter 5 of the Municipal Systems Act which is dedicated to integrated development 
planning, specifically in section 23(1)(c), oblige municipalities to contribute, together with other 
organs of state, to the progressive realisation of the constitutional environmental right. The Court held 
                                                             
30 Le Sueur and Another, par 19. 
31 See Le Sueur and Another, par 20. 
32 See Le Sueur and Another, par 20. 
33 See Le Sueur and Another, par 20. 
34 See Le Sueur and Another, par 20. 
35 See Le Sueur and Another, pars 21 and 39. 
36 See Le Sueur and Another, pars 22, 30 and 39. 
37 See Le Sueur and Another, pars 22–24 and 39. 
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that this was a clear mandate from national legislation obliging municipalities to promote 
environmental objectives. 38  The Court also recognised that municipalities have spatial planning 
powers and can rezone land in line with their spatial development frameworks which must be 
consistent with their IDPs as well as provincial and national legislation.39 The Court noted that D-
MOSS was introduced in line with the municipality's IDP requirements and that the law makes 
provision for environmental issues to be addressed in the IDP of every municipality.40 Judge Gyanda 
accepted the view that “it is impossible as a matter of accepted town planning practice to divorce 
environmental and conservation concerns from town planning principles”.41 The Court established 
that D-MOSS did not conflict with any national or provincial legislation/policy. 42  Based on this 
analysis, the learned judge held that: 
In the result, I am satisfied that the first respondent has proved that prior to the 
advent of the Constitution ‘Municipal Planning’ involved the power to regulate land-
use whilst taking into account, amongst other things, the need to protect the natural 
environment.  It is clear that the term ‘Municipal Planning’ encompassed that 
meaning when used in the Constitution.  I am accordingly in full agreement with the 
first respondent’s submission that it is impossible to separate environmental and 
conservation concerns in town planning practice from a ‘Municipal Planning’ 
perspective.43   
In addition to the above reasons, the Court recognised that the national environmental management 
principles outlined in section 2 of NEMA apply to actions of all organs of state that may significantly 
affect the environment – including the actions of municipalities.44 Apart from these general principles, 
there are specific provisions of NEMA as well as other legislation, policies and regulations which 
specifically recognise the duties of municipalities with regard to the environment in its municipal 
planning function.45  Based on these duties, the Court held that municipalities are entitled to regulate 
environmental matters from the micro level for the protection of the environment. 
Based on the three main reasons discussed above, the judge held that municipalities are in fact 
authorised to legislate in respect of environmental matters to protect the environment at the local level 
and that the D-MOSS Amendments did not in any way transgress or intrude upon the exclusive 
purview of the national and provincial government in respect of environmental legislation or policy.  
The judge held that the D-MOSS amendments introduced by the first respondent was not 
                                                             
38 Le Sueur and Another, par 24. 
39 Le Sueur and Another, pars 25–28. 
40 Le Sueur and Another, pars 27–29. 
41 Le Sueur and Another, pars 29 and 33. 
42 Le Sueur and Another, pars 27–29. 
43 Le Sueur and Another, par 33. 
44 Le Sueur and Another, par 34. 
45 Le Sueur and Another, pars 37–38. 
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unconstitutional and invalid on the basis contended by the applicants, namely, that the first respondent 
did not have the authority to legislate in this regard.46 The Court dismissed the application with costs. 
Lessons and potential role for courts  
A number of lessons could be drawn from the Le Sueur case discussed above. The most obvious 
lesson is that the environmental powers and functions of municipalities cannot be defined exclusively 
with reference to the Schedules in the Constitution. As Justice Gyanda put it in the Le Sueur case, 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution are not the only provisions dealing with governmental 
responsibilities and duties. Any analysis of local government’s environmental powers and duties 
cannot be exhaustive without a consideration of the implications of section 7(2) and 24 of the 
Constitution. The socio-economic rights jurisprudence of courts is useful in understanding the powers 
and functions of municipalities in relation to the environment. It should be noted that, in broad terms, 
the methodology used by Justice Gyanda in Le Sueur resonates with that of the Constitutional Court 
in the Blue Moonlight case. Although Blue Moonlight Properties did not deal with environmental 
matters47 it is important in this context because the Constitutional Court clearly indicated that the 
powers and functions of municipalities in socio-economic rights cases (specifically the right of access 
to housing) go beyond the rigid confines of Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution.48  
The Constitutional Court held that the legislative and executive powers and functions of 
municipalities must be understood in the context of the entire constitutional framework, its earlier 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence and the specific obligations imposed by national and provincial 
legislation as well as policies on local government.49  By analogy, the reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court in the Blue Moonlight case extends to the environmental constitutional right because of its 
socio-economic rights character (du Plessis 2011, pp. 279–307) and the similar (albeit not uniform) 
nature of the obligations imposed by the Constitution, legislation and policies on municipalities to 
contribute towards the realisation of the rights entrenched in sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the 
Constitution.50 Therefore, the position adopted by the Pietermaritzburg High Court in Le Sueur in 
relation to how to understand the legislative and executive environmental powers and functions of 
municipalities is similar to that earlier adopted by the Constitutional Court in Blue Moonlight in the 
context of the right of access to housing. In any event, Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution are 
non-exhaustive of local government's executive and law-making powers and functions.  
                                                             
46 Le Sueur and Another, par 40. 
47 For facts of the case, see Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd, pars 1–9. 
48 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd, pars 20–28, 42–67. 
49 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd, pars 20–28, 42–67. 
50 See for example, s 23(1)(c) of the Systems Act. While the wording of the socio-economic entitlements in 
sections 26(1), 27(1) and 29(1) of the Constitution leaves them subject to progressive realisation, this is not the 
case with the s 24 constitutional environmental right. 
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In addition, one can draw from Le Sueur and the Constitutional Court's socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence in Blue Moonlight Properties that there is nothing which prevents municipalities that 
have the necessary resources to self-fund environmental projects that typically fall within the 
legislative area of competence of national and provincial government - as defined by Schedules 4A 
and 5A – in so far as such projects seek to further the objectives of section 24 of the Constitution51 
and are not in conflict with national and provincial programmes. It now appears that, when exercising 
its original and assigned powers and functions, a municipality can adopt bylaws to protect against 
improper invasion any environmental matters listed in Schedules 4A and 5A of the Constitution in so 
far as this relates to its functions and to the extent that the bylaw does not conflict with a provincial 
and national legislation.52 This is connected to the incidental administrative powers conferred on 
municipalities by section 156(5) of the Constitution. A close reading of the Constitutional Court's 
jurisprudence in City of Cape Town v Robertson suggests that a municipality can do anything to foster 
constitutional objectives provided such action is not illegal. 53  By providing more 'room' for non 
Schedule 4B / 5B activities for local government, courts help to better position municipalities for the 
pursuit of NEMA's objectives in combination with the rights in the Bill of Rights – including the 
environmental right. The approach of courts help municipalities that are willing and capable, to be 
able to see to their fulfilment of s 24 of the Constitution where the lists in the Schedules tend to make 
this difficult for local government in some areas – such as biodiversity conservation. 
Thirdly, it is also evident that municipal planning is inextricably linked to environmental issues and 
could be used to foster environmental objectives.54 In Le Sueur, the learned judge traced this link to 
statutes enacted before and during the local government transition period.55 This historically self-
conscious approach to the interpretation of the planning and environmental powers and functions of 
municipalities is also complemented by the number of sector-specific environmental plans that are 
supposed to be part of local government integrated development planning – Spatial Development 
Frameworks, Waste Management Plans, Air Quality Management Plans and Biodiversity Plans must 
all be aligned to the IDP (Fuo 2014, pp. 351–357). 
Fourthly, although the jurisprudence of courts in Le Sueur and Blue Moonlight Properties clearly 
indicate that the powers of municipalities in fostering environmental objectives go beyond Schedules 
4B and 5B of the Constitution, the intricacies of such powers have not been exhaustively defined. 
This will continuously be defined over time by way of legislation, policies and judicial interpretation. 
                                                             
51 See Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd, pars 53, 57 and 67. 
52 See Le Sueur and Another, par 19. 
53 City of Cape Town and Other v Robertson, par 60.  
54 Le Sueur and Another, pars 22–24 and 30–33. 
55 Le Sueur and Another, pars 22–24, 30–33 and 39. 
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The contribution the judiciary has made towards clarifying the constitutional environmental powers 
and functions of municipalities in Le Sueur (and Blue Moonlight Properties, by way of analogy) show 
that courts have the potential to contribute towards delineating the contours of local government's 
constitutional environmental powers and functions beyond Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution. 
This can be achieved by purposively interpreting existing functions in Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution or through interpretations of local government's responsibilities in relation to s 24 of the 
Constitution. Such interpretations may redefine in a more concrete manner the role of municipalities 
in giving effect to the section 24 constitutional environmental rights.  
Litigation provides courts an opportunity to overturn any existing laws or policies that unduly limit 
the role of municipalities in fostering the objectives of section 24 of the Constitution, especially where 
environmental issues directly affect local communities. In addition, environmental litigation may be 
used to enforce underutilised legal principles such as the principle of institutional subsidiarity located 
in section 156(4) of the Constitution. This may pave the way for the assignment of more 
environmental functions to municipalities where all the prescribed criteria for assignment have been 
met. However, environmental litigation remains only one of the tools that can be used to further 
define the constitutional environmental powers and functions of municipalities. Political lobbying 
may herald legislation and policies that provide greater clarity on local government's constitutional 
environmental powers and functions. In the meantime, intergovernmental cooperation should play a 
pivotal role in addressing tensions that arise especially where there is uncertainty over the boundaries 
of local government's constitutional environmental powers and functions. Conflicts abound due to the 
fact that the powers and functions of the three spheres of government in relation to the environment 
are not hermetically sealed.  
Conclusion 
The Constitution places local government at the forefront of sustainable development in South Africa. 
This is evident from the objects of local government and the obligation placed on all spheres of 
government to use legislative and other measures to give effect to the broad objectives of section 24 
of the Constitution. Despite these broad constitutional obligations, the exact scope of local 
government's constitutional environmental powers and functions are not always clearly defined. 
Drawing lessons from Le Sueur, this article argues that environmental litigation provides courts an 
opportunity to redefine the powers of municipalities in fostering constitutional environmental 
objectives in South Africa. It argues that despite the important role of courts, intergovernmental 
cooperation is important in clarifying the powers and functions of South African municipalities. 
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